Dancing With Yemen - Political Opinion

For many years, Yemen’s had a shady relationship with Islamic militants. In the late 1980s, they welcomed thousands of Afghani-trained mujahideen into the country and, in 1994, President Ali Abdullah Saleh (left) used his connections to such militant factions in order to suppress a brief north-south civil war. Since then, ties have remained — for both the government and the Islamists, there appears to be a continuing sense that common interests exist. No surprise, then, that even despite Bush administration pressure (often manifesting itself in threats of aid cutoffs), the Yemeni government has been reticent about instituting a serious crackdown.

The Yemeni authorities argue that they’re doing all they can, but that they must play it safe for fear of a domestic backlash. Indeed, large percentages of the Yemeni populace have high regard for the likes of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Yet while an Islamist crackdown would certainly be unpopular, this reality is also conveniently held up by Saleh’s government in order to justify government inaction.

Like the Saudis, Yemeni authorities have started a “re-education” (or “de-radicalization”) program for violent Islamists. The New York Times suggested recently, however, that many outside observers consider the program to be nothing more than a joke - that instead of getting at the root of the theological problem, the de-radicalization effort merely helps to convince Yemeni militants to go abroad if they want to engage in violence. Andrew McGregor, writing for The Jamestown Foundation, provides some additional information on the country’s efforts:

As the leader of Yemen’s Dialogue Committee, [the Minister for Endowments and Religious Guidance, Judge Hamoud Abdulhamid] al-Hitar developed a policy of confronting incarcerated militants in debates designed to expose their misinterpretations of Islamic doctrine and challenge the legitimacy of al-Qaeda-style jihadism. Using “mutual respect” as a basis for the discussions, al-Hitar points to numerous successes in reforming the views of extremist prisoners, some of whom later provided the security apparatus with important intelligence.

Hundreds of terrorism suspects have passed through the program. Recidivism is untracked, however, and there are reports that some of those released went to Iraq to fight U.S.-led coalition forces. The list of graduates is closely guarded, and ex-prisoners are warned not to discuss their participation in the dialogues, thus allowing a degree of deniability should graduates return to terrorism.

American officials appear stuck on this last fact, worrying that the program is disingenuous and merely designed to pull Washington’s chain. Adding to their concern, arrests of Islamic militants are often short-lived. “Reformed” militants are regularly freed and, although monitored by the government, there is little accountability with regards to foreign travel. When 23 al-Qaeda figures mysteriously escaped from a well-guarded prison in Sana’a in 2006, doubts were raised further about the government’s true intentions. And not unjustly so, I might add, given that it was later revealed that the prisoners escaped through a tunnel connected to al-Hitar’s mosque.

Perhaps for good reason, the relationship between Washington and Sana’a is fueled by mistrust. Washington doesn’t fully believe the Yemeni government’s intentions, given the fact that Yemeni fighters have shown up in Iraq, the discovery of a cache of Yemeni rifles used on an attack on the American embassy in Jeddah, the failure of the government to purge radicals from the highest levels of the security services, and as a result of stories like that of the 23 al-Qaeda escapees. Additionally, there is little faith — in either academic or policymaking circles — that Yemen’s counter-terrorism “re-education” program is anything more than crock.

Not unlike American policy towards Pakistan, Washington feels stuck between a range of bad options. Thankfully, the Bush administration, in many ways, is playing Sana’a much better than they have Islamabad. In particular, American officials have started to get hip with the importance of encouraging political and economic reform in Yemen, important steps that will inevitably undercut the influence of radicals. For the past several years, they’ve been engaged in negotiations over Millenium Challenge Account funding with the Yemeni government, an incentive structure that has resulted in a range of much-needed changes. For this policy, the administration deserves our praise. While tough times are certainly ahead to get Yemeni acquiescence on short-term terrorism concerns, the Bush administration’s reform program is laudatory and is effectively laying the groundwork for longer-term peace and stability on the Gulf.