Several areas witness resurrection against the state, tribal conflicts, mobility or violent acts and these acts are associated with complete absence of state presence. In most governorates, the state does control only the main cities.

Bani Dhabian, Sana’a

Bani Dhabian is a tribal district in Sana’a province’s Khawlan region whose tribesmen implement constant kidnapping operations. There is no presence for security or the state apparatuses there and the last kidnapping incident targeted Businessman Tawfiq Al-Khamri’s brother. Prior to this, the tribesmen released the business manager of Shahr Abdul Haq following tribal mediation efforts. The tribesmen make big sums of money, as kidnapping is a source for wealth and it is a direct result for the lack of trust in judiciary.

Amran Governorate

Armed conflicts are ongoing in Al-Sawad area between the tribes of Al-Ausimat Hashed and Al-Ashah tribes of Bakil. Heavy and medium-sized weapons are used. Around 200 tribesmen have been killed and over 400 others injured. The apparent cause for war is a conflict over lands.

Al-Dhale’ Governorate

Al-Dhale’, with its four districts “Al-Azareq, Al-Shuaeeb, Al-Dhale’ and Jihaf”, are completely outside the state’s control and flags of former south Yemen are being hoisted everywhere. However, there is a formal presence for security and government appartuses. The city is dominated by the Aboud’s Armored Brigade which has been positioned there since 1994. The security presence is almost absent in the four districts, with a small exception to Al-Dhal’e district, the governorate’s capital. Security administrations have no noticeable work.

The Armored 35 Brigade, positioned in Al-Anad, is controlling the areas stretching from Al-Dhale’ to Al-Anad and it is led by Brig. Mohammed Abdullah Haidar, a military leader from Sanhan.

By mind June, a new brigade from the “Republican Guards” was deployed to Al-Dhale’ and it is positioned now in Murais Mountain which overlooks Al-Dhale’ city.

The National Council led by Ba’awm, Ameen Saleh and Mohammed Mus’ad Naji enjoys wide popularity in Al-Dhale and recently the Revolution Council has entered the city. A southern political leader who preferred to remain anonymous noted that “the secession has been an objective for the regime acted in its daily practices and behavior.”

Lahj Governorate

Secessionist flags are hoisted in Radfan, Yafe’ and other districts of Lahj governorate and these flags are seen everywhere. The Central Security is strongly present in Al-Hawtah, the capital city of Lahj. It is also present in Tuban district which neighbors Al-Hawtah. There exists Al-Anad Camp “July 7” there too.

The 35 Armored Brigade is positioned in Aiqan area located between Karish and Al-Musimir districts and it resorts to excessive force to suppress any mobility in these areas, especially when these areas were former and hot border areas.

There is no presence for the state or its apparatuses in Tour Al-Bahah and Ras Al-Arah districts. Following the killing of Hafez and Yahya Al-Sumali by security apparatuses, the tribesmen revolted and fired all state apparatuses including the Central Security and transferred the state office branches to Al-Hawtah.

Yahya Al-Sumali’s brother, Yasser, was appointed as a manager of Tour Al-Bahah. The state is completely absent there now. Three district managers were appointed by the state; however, none managed to do anything. Yasser Al-Sumali managed to resolve some existing conflicts and revenge killing problems.

Dr. Nasser Al-Khabji, from Najah Movement, is the most prominent mobility leader in Radfan district and Awadh Al-Salahi, a Yemeni Socialist Party member, enjoys popularity in Yafe’. Both districts are dominated by the southern mobility.

Al-Askariah area remains one of the most important signs since the rise of the southern mobility because three people from northern areas were brutally killed on July 10, 2009. Though the authorities managed to arrest the killer’s two sons, the killer himself is still at large.

Most people belonging to northern provinces left districts like Yafe’, Radfan, Al-Sabihah, Al-Anad and the commercial investments were shut following Al-Askariah’s incident and the killing of three people from Al-Qabeetah – belonging to the northern province of Taiz.

Similarly, Al-Azibah tribe – in Sabr area of Lahj governorate – constantly introduces checkpoints and blockades the highway. They are sometimes involved in armed confrontations over the ownership of lands located between Aden and Lahj.

Abyan Governorate

Zingubar remains of the tense and burning areas and the name of Tareq Al-Fadhli stands out and no army or security personnel dare to enter Ja’ar city. Both cities are dominated by the Central Security – that occupies an area of stretching for 2 km – which has the key checkpoints in the two districts as they are the most important districts of Abyan. The 312 Brigade is positioned in Zingubar outskirts.

The Revolution Council lead by Al-Fadhli and Al-Beedh are dominating the scene. 20 people were killed and 30 others injured in a protest that took place on July 23. It is a turning point with arms being resorted to by the mobility and authority.

A mobility festival is conducted every Thursday in Lawder district to which Abyan’s former governor Mohammed Ali Ahmed belongs. There is a good business there as it is a connection point.

There is also some activities for mobility followers in Al-Wadhee distirct, the homeland of former President of South Yemen Ali Nasser Mohammed. Vice President Abdu Rabu Hadi belongs to this district too.

Likewise, the mobility is proportionally powerful in Rusud, Sirar and Sabah and most people bear their arms. In Sirar, the social cohesion help reduce the mobility’s intensity. The mobility is not that much present in Sabah because it is a rugged and remote district.

In Shuqrah is seemingly clear of both the government and the mobility. Mobility activists are weak in Al Hassanah and Al Al-Miyaser areas in Mudiah district, to which the current governor of Abyan belongs.

Al-Jawf Governorate:

Sheikh Ali Al-Aji, a dignitary from Al-Jawf stresses that the security presence is zero and noted that although security sites exist along the distance from Mafraq Al-Jawf to the capital city – about 30 km – their existence is formal. Tribesmen are tightly controlling Al-Hazm and Al-Khalq districts.

Houthi Abu Saleh has recently managed to control most Al-Jawf areas including Al-Ghail, Al-Zahr, Al-Matemah, Al-Marajeem, Rajwzah, Barat Al-Emamah and he has turned to be the ruler there. His dominance stretches to Mareb’s Magzar.

Neither the state nor Houthis have presence in Al-Khab and Al-Sha’ab district – some 200 km from the capital city. The district stretches from the peripherals of Al-Abr in Hadramout and ends in the peripherals of Sa’ada.

Most officials in Al-Jawf, including the governor, security and financial officers belong to Thu Hussein of Mareb’s Murad. There is a complete sidelining of Hamadan tribe who are unhappy about the “Sponsorship Theory”.

However, the conflict is ongoing in Hamdan and Al-Shulan and dozens have been killed and injured. Battles are fought in areas close to the center of the capital city and heavy and medium-sized weapons are used.

Abu Rawiah, a wanted criminal who be